We present a general formal argumentation system for dealing with the detachment of conditional obligations. Given a set of facts, constraints, and conditional obligations, we answer the question whether an unconditional obligation is detachable by considering reasons for and against its detachment. For the evaluation of arguments in favor of detaching obligations we use a Dung-style argumentation-theoretical semantics. We illustrate the modularity of the general framework by considering some extensions, and we compare the framework to some related approaches from the literature.
Introduction
We take an argumentative perspective on the problem of detaching conditional obligations relative to a set of facts and constraints. We allow for the construction of arguments the deontic conclusions of which are candidates for detachment. Next, we define a number of ways in which these arguments may attack one another, as when the conclusions of two arguments are conflicting. We borrow Dung's semantics [6] for evaluating arguments relative to the attack relations that hold between them. Conclusions of arguments which are evaluated positively are safely detachable in our framework. They can be interpreted as all-things-considered obligations -following Ross [28] -or output obligationsfollowing Makinson & van der Torre [18, 19] .
The argumentative approach defended in this paper is both natural and precise. Norms which guide reasoning are naturally construed as conclusions of proof sequences. Objections raised against the derivation of certain obligations are naturally construed as argumentative attacks. Arguments are naturally evaluated in terms of the objections raised against them.
In Section 2 we introduce a basic argumentation system for evaluating arguments the conclusions of which can be interpreted as all-things-considered obligations. This generic, modular framework can be extended in various ways, as we illustrate in Section 3. We show how various mechanisms for conflictresolution can be implemented (Section 3.1), and how we can rule out obligations committing us to further violations or conflicts (Section 3.2). In Section 4 we compare our approach to related systems from the literature. We end by pointing to some further expansions of our framework, which we aim to present in a follow-up paper (Section 5).
The basic framework
We start by reviewing the basic concepts needed from Dung's semantics (Section 2.1). Next we turn to the construction of deontic arguments (Section 2.2) and attack definitions (Section 2.3). We define a consequence relation for detaching all-things-considered obligations in deontic argumentation frameworks (Section 2.4), and present some of its meta-theoretical properties (Section 2.5).
Abstract argumentation
A Dung-style abstract argumentation framework (AF) is a pair (A, Att) where A is a set of arguments and Att ⊆ A × A is a binary relation of attack. Relative to an AF, Dung defines a number of extensions -subsets of A -on the basis of which we can evaluate the arguments in A.
Definition 1 (Complete and grounded extension). Let (A, Att) be an AF. For any a ∈ A, a is acceptable w.r.t. some S ⊆ A (or, S defends a) iff for all b such that (b, a) ∈ Att there is a c ∈ S for which (c, b) ∈ Att. If S ⊆ A is conflict-free, i.e. there are no a, b ∈ S for which (a, b) ∈ Att, then:
• S is a complete extension iff a ∈ S whenever a is acceptable w.r.t. S; • S is the grounded extension iff it is the set inclusion minimal complete extension.
Dung [6] showed that for every AF there is a grounded extension, it is unique, and it can be constructed as follows.
Definition 2 (Defense).
A set of arguments X defends an argument a iff every attacker of a is attacked by some b ∈ X .
Definition 3 (Construction of the grounded extension). The grounded extension G relative to an AF (A, Att) is defined as follows (where A is countable):
• G 0 : the set of all arguments in A without attackers;
• G i+1 : all arguments defended by G i ;
Besides the grounded extension, a number of further extensions (preferred, (semi-)stable, ideal etc.) have been defined in the literature. Due to space limitations, we focus exclusively on grounded extensions in the remainder.
On Dung's abstract approach [6] , arguments are basic units of analysis the internal structure of which is not represented. But nothing prevents us from instantiating such abstract arguments by conceptualizing them as proof trees for deriving a conclusion based on a set of premises and inference rules. Frameworks with instantiated arguments are called structured argumentation frameworks (for examples, see e.g. [1] ).
1 In the remainder of Section 2 we show how questions regarding obligation detachment in deontic logic can be addressed and answered within structured deontic argumentation frameworks.
Instantiating deontic arguments
Our formal language L is defined as follows:
The classical connectives ∧, ⊃, ≡ are defined in terms of ¬ and ∨. We represent facts as members of L P . Where A, B ∈ L P , conditional obligations are formulas of the form A ⇒ B, read 'If A, then it -prima facie -ought to be that B' or 'If A, then B is prima facie obligatory'.
2 Where A ∈ L P , a constraint A abbreviates that A is settled, i.e. that A holds unalterably.
3 Formulas of the form OA (where A ∈ L P ) represent all-things-considered obligations. Unless specified otherwise, upper case letters A, B, . . . denote members of L P and upper case Greek letters Γ, ∆,
which we use as a 1 Our approach is similar in spirit to the ASP IC + framework for structured argumentation from e.g. [20] . We return to this point in Section 4.2.
2 Depending on the context of application, the following alternative readings are also fine: 'If A is the case, then B is pro tanto obligatory', 'If A, then the agent ought (prima facie, pro tanto) to bring about B'. On the latter, agentive reading, we can think of '⇒' as implicitly indexed by an agent. 3 If A holds, then the fact that A is deemed fixed, necessary, and unalterable. Obligations which contradict these facts are unalterably violated. Carmo & Jones cite three factors giving rise to such unalterable violations. The first is time, e.g. when you did not return a book you ought to have returned by its due date. The second is causal necessity, e.g. when you killed a person you ought not to have killed. The third is practical impossibility, e.g. when a dog owner stubbornly refuses to keep her dog against the house regulations, and nobody else dares to try and convince her to remove it [4, pp. 283-284] .
generic name for a modal logic for representing background constraints, e.g. T, S4, S5, etc. In our examples below, we will assume that L is normal and validates the axiom A ⊃ A.
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Arguments are ordered pairs A : s in which A is called the conclusion, and s a proof sequence for deriving A. We use lower case letters a, b, c, . . . as placeholders for arguments.
Definition 4. Given a premise set Γ, we allow the following rules for constructing arguments:
A : −− is an argument; (where −− denotes the empty proof sequence) is an argument.
(v) If a = OA : . . . is an argument and
Argument a is a deontic argument if a is of the form OA : . . . . We use C(a) to denote the set of all formulas in L used in the construction of a, including its conclusion. E.g. where a = Oq : p, p ⇒ q and b = Or : a, q ⇒ r ,
; and b is a super-argument of argument a if a is a proper sub-argument of b.
(ii)-(v) correspond to inference rules well-known from deontic logic.
(ii) allows for the factual detachment of an all-things-considered obligation OB from a conditional prima facie obligation A ⇒ B and a fact A. (iii) is a deontic detachment principle. (iv) and (v) allow for obligation aggregation (or agglomeration), resp. inheritance (or weakening).
Example 1 (Constructing arguments). Let Γ 1 = { p, ⊤ ⇒ ¬p, ¬p ⇒ ¬q, p ⇒ q}. By Definition 4 we can construct -amongst others -the following arguments from Γ 1 :
O¬p : ⊤, ⊤ ⇒ ¬p
O¬q : a 2 , ¬p ⇒ ¬q a 6 : O(q ∨ r) : a 4 , (q ⊃ (q ∨ r)) Argument a 1 is constructed from p ∈ Γ 1 in view of (i). Arguments a 2 and a 4 are constructed by means of (ii) 5 ; a 3 is constructed from a 2 by means of (iii); a 5 is constructed from a 3 and a 4 by (iv); and a 6 is constructed from a 4 by (v).
We can interpret Γ 1 as representing a classic contrary-to-duty (CTD) scenario (for the sake of readability, we omit the qualifier 'prima facie' in our reading of conditional obligations):
There ought not be a dog. ¬p ⇒ ¬q If there is no dog, there ought not be a warning sign.
If there is a dog, there ought to be a warning sign. p It is settled that there is a dog. Of course, not all of the conclusions of arguments a 2 -a 6 qualify as all-thingsconsidered obligations. Argument a 5 , for instance, is internally incoherent and should be filtered out when evaluating the arguments constructed from Γ 1 . Arguments are evaluated in terms of the attack relations which hold amongst them. Before we turn to the definition of these relations, we point out that rules (i)-(v) in Definition 4 allow for a version of the necessitation rule whenever L is a normal modal logic. For instance, given a premise set { p, ⊤ ⇒ q}, we can construct the argument a 1 = Oq : ⊤, ⊤ ⇒ q by (ii). Since p ⊢ L (q ⊃ p), we can construct the argument a 2 = Op : a 1 , (q ⊃ p) by (v). If desired, the construction of a 2 can be prevented by defining -in addition to '⊃' -a weaker (non-material) implication connective in L on the basis of which to construct arguments in line with clause (v) in Definition 4.
Attacking deontic arguments
In our basic framework, we define two ways in which arguments may attack one another. First, we take care that unalterably violated obligations are attacked by the constraints which violate them. (We write A = −B in case A = ¬B or B = ¬A.) Definition 5 (Fact attack). Where a = OA : . . . is an argument, let UO(a) = {B | OB ∈ C(a)}. Where ∅ = Θ ⊆ UO(a), − Θ : −− attacks a.
In Example 1 the obligation O¬p cannot guide the agent's actions, since it cannot be acted upon in view of the constraint p. Definition 5 takes care that a 1 attacks a 2 , since UO(b) = {¬p}. Note that, as soon as A ∈ UO(a) for some argument a and formula A, A ∈ UO(b) for any super-argument b of a. Consequently, if an argument c attacks a in view of Definition 5, then c also attacks all super-arguments b of a. So in Example 1 the argument a 1 attacks a 2 as well as its super-arguments a 3 and a 5 .
Since we assume that L is a normal modal logic, we know that (¬(¬q ∧ q)) ∈ Cn L (Γ 1 ). Hence, by Definition 5 again, argument a 7 = (¬(¬q ∧ q)) : −− attacks argument a 5 from Example 1.
Example 2 (Attacks on incoherent arguments). Let Γ 2 = {⊤ ⇒ p, ⊤ ⇒ ¬p, ⊤ ⇒ q}. We construct the following arguments on the basis of Γ 2 :
Oq : ⊤, ⊤ ⇒ q a 6 :
By Definition 5:
Hence, both a 5 and a 6 are attacked by a 7 :
Arguments a 5 and a 6 are incoherent in the sense that in constructing them we relied on arguments the conclusions of which are conflicting (namely a 1 and a 2 ). It is vital that we are able to filter out such incoherent arguments. Definition 5 takes care of that. By attacking a 6 , argument a 7 protects (defends) the unproblematic a 3 , which is attacked by a 6 in view of Definition 6 below. We return to this point in footnote 8, after we explained how arguments are evaluated.
The second type of attack relation ensures that mutually incompatible obligations attack each other: In Example 1, arguments a 3 and a 4 attack each other according to Definition 6. Moreover, a 3 attacks a 5 and a 6 ; and a 4 attacks a 5 . Likewise, in Example 2, a 1 and a 2 attack each other, and so do a 3 and a 6 . Moreover, a 1 attacks a 5 and a 6 ; and a 2 attacks a 4 , a 5 , and a 6 .
We construct the following arguments on the basis of Γ 3 :
O¬s : a 1 , (r ⊃ ¬s) a 4 attacks a 3 by Definition 5. By Definition 6 a 1 attacks a 5 ; a 5 attacks a 1 , a 3 , and a 6 ; a 2 attacks a 6 ; and a 6 attacks a 2 , a 3 , and a 5 .
Evaluating deontic arguments
For the evaluation of deontic arguments relative to a premise set, we extend Dung-style AFs to deontic argumentation frameworks, and we borrow Dung's argument evaluation mechanism from Definitions 1-3:
• A(Γ) is the set of arguments constructed from Γ in line with Definition 4; and • where a, b ∈ A(Γ): (a, b) ∈ Att(Γ) iff a attacks b according to Definition 5 or Definition 6. Like AFs, DAFs can be represented as directed graphs. Here, for instance, is a graph depicting the arguments we constructed on the basis of Γ 1 : We evaluate arguments in a DAF using Dung's grounded semantics from Section 2.1: In Definition 1, replace A (resp. Att) with A(Γ) (resp. Att(Γ)). Similarly for Definition 3, where we also replace occurrences of G and G i with G(Γ) and G i (Γ) respectively.
Let us now apply Definition 3 to Example 1. Clearly, a 1 , a 7 ∈ G 0 (Γ 1 ), since Definitions 5 and 6 provide us with no means to attack arguments the conclusions of which are members of Γ 1 . In the next step of our construction, a 4 , a 6 ∈ G 1 (Γ 1 ), since they are defended by a 1 ∈ G 0 (Γ 1 ). a 2 , a 3 , a 5 ∈ G 1 (Γ 1 ), since each of these arguments is attacked by a 1 (hence undefended).
We cannot construct any further arguments which attack a 4 or a 6 and which do not contain any of the undefended arguments a 2 or a 3 as sub-arguments. Moreover, we show in the Appendix (Lemma 2) that, for any premise set Γ, if a ∈ G(Γ), then a ∈ G 1 (Γ). By the Definition 3, a 1 , a 4 , a 6 , a 7 ∈ G(Γ 1 ) while a 2 , a 3 , a 5 ∈ G(Γ 1 ).
By Definition 8, Γ 1 ⊢ DAF Oq and Γ 1 ⊢ DAF O(q ∨ r), while Γ 1 ⊢ DAF O¬p and Γ 1 ⊢ DAF O¬q. In Example 2, Γ 2 ⊢ DAF Oq. 8 We leave it to the reader to check that none of Op, O¬p, O(p ∨ ¬q), or O¬q is a DAF-consequence of Γ 2 , and that none of Or, Os, O(r ∧ s), O¬r, or O¬s is a DAF-consequence of Γ 3 .
Rationality postulates
In [3, Sec. 4 ] the properties of output closure and output consistency were proposed as desiderata for well-behaved argumentation systems. Where Output(Γ) = {A | Γ ⊢ DAF OA}:
Property 2 (Consistency). Cn CL (Output(Γ)) is consistent.
Properties 1 and 2 follow for DAF in view of resp. Theorems 1 and 2 in the Appendix. Property 3 is proven in Theorem 3 in the Appendix:
Properties 4 and 5 fail for DAF:
Example 4 (Failure of properties 4 and 5, adapted from [2] ). Let Γ 4 = {p, p ⇒ q, q ⇒ r, r ⇒ ¬q, ¬q ⇒ s, ⊤ ⇒ ¬s}. We construct the following arguments on the basis of Γ 4 :
Or : a 1 , q ⇒ r a 5 : O¬s : ⊤, ⊤ ⇒ ¬s a 3 :
O¬q : a 2 , r ⇒ ¬q a 6 : ¬(q ∧ ¬q) : −− By Definition 6: a 1 attacks a 3 and a 4 ; a 3 attacks all of a 1 -a 4 (including itself ); and a 4 and a 5 attack each other. By Definition 5, a 6 attacks a 3 and a 4 , since both q and ¬q are members of UO(a 3 ) and UO(a 4 ). As a result, Oq, Or, and O¬s are DAF-consequences of Γ 4 , while O¬q and Os are not. Now add the new conditional obligation ⊤ ⇒ r to Γ 4 , so that we obtain the new arguments a 7 : Or : ⊤, ⊤ ⇒ r a 9 :
O¬q : a 7 , r ⇒ ¬q None of these new arguments is attacked by a 6 , which defends a 1 and a 5 from the attacks by a 3 and a 4 respectively. By Definition 6, a 8 and a 1 attack each other. So do a 9 and a 5 . As a result, none of a 1 , a 5 , a 8 , and a 9 is in the grounded extension of Γ 4 ∪ {⊤ ⇒ r}. So we have a counter-example to Property 4: Γ 4 ⊢ DAF Or and Γ 4 ⊢ DAF O¬s, while Γ 4 ∪ {⊤ ⇒ r} ⊢ DAF O¬s.
This example also serves to illustrate the failure of Property 5 for DAF. Arguments with conclusion O¬r can be constructed on the basis of Γ 4 only on the basis of incoherent arguments. Let, for instance:
In view of Definition 5, arguments constructed on an incoherent basis are attacked by an otherwise unattacked argument. For instance, a 11 is attacked by the unattacked argument a 6 . Because of this, Γ 4 ⊢ DAF O¬r. But then, since Γ 4 ⊢ DAF O¬s and Γ 4 ∪ {⊤ ⇒ r} ⊢ DAF O¬s, Property 5 fails for DAF.
3 Beyond the basics 3.1 Conflict-resolution
Resolving conflicts via logical analysis
It has been argued that, in cases of conflict, more specific obligations should be given precedence over less specific ones.
9 Consider the following example:
We can interpret Γ 5 as representing a scenario in which an agent is making carrot soup. Let p, q, and, respectively, r abbreviate 'there is fennel', 'there are carrots', and 'there is celery'. If there are carrots in the garden still, our agent should take care that he buys fennel in order to make the soup (q ⇒ p). However, if both carrots and celery are in the garden, he should not get fennel ((q ∧ r) ⇒ ¬p), because celery can be used instead of fennel. As it turns out, both carrots and celery are in his garden (q, r). The desirable outcome in this case is that the agent ought not go out and buy fennel.
A principled way of obtaining outcomes in which more specific obligations are preferred over less specific ones, is to define specificity in terms of logical strength, and to define a new attack relation for letting more specific arguments attack less specific ones. Let the factual support of a deontic argument a be the set S(a) = {B | B ∈ (C(a) ∩ L P )}. We write S(a) ⊑ S(b) iff for all A ∈ S(a) there is a B ∈ S(b) such that A ⊢ B and for all B ∈ S(b) there is an A ∈ S(a) such that A ⊢ B. S(a) ⊏ S(b) (a is more specific than b) iff S(a) ⊑ S(b) and S(b) ⊑ S(a).
We replace Definition 6 with Definition 9: Let DAF s (with subscript 's' for specificity) be the logic resulting from constructing the attack relation Att on the basis of Definitions 5 and 9.
In Example 5, we construct the following arguments from Γ 5 :
Op : q, q ⇒ p a 2 :
O¬p : q ∧ r, (q ∧ r) ⇒ ¬p Since S(a 2 ) ⊏ S(a 1 ), a 2 attacks a 1 by Definition 9, but not vice versa. As a result, only a 2 is in Γ 5 's grounded extension, and Γ 5 ⊢ DAFs O¬p, while Γ 5 ⊢ DAFs Op.
In Example 3, the factual support of the arguments constructed from Γ 3 is such that S(a 2 ) = S(a 5 ) ⊏ S(a 1 ) = S(a 6
In dealing with conflict-resolution via logical analysis, we have chosen for a cautious notion of specificity. For instance, {p} ⊏ {p, q} and {p} ⊏ {p ∧ q, r}. In certain contexts it may be sensible to opt for a stronger characterization of '⊏'. A detailed discussion of such issues would lead us too far astray given our present purposes. Instead, we point out that our framework readily accommodates alternative characterizations of '⊏' to be used in Definition 9.
Resolving conflicts via priorities
Instead of (or in combination with) conflict-resolution via logical analysis, a priority ordering ≤ can be introduced over conditional norms, and our formal language can be adjusted accordingly. Conditional norms then come with an associated degree of priority α ∈ Z + , written A ⇒ α B (higher numbers denote higher priorities).
We lift ≤ to a priority ordering over arguments via the weakest link principle: an argument is only as strong as the weakest priority conditional used in its construction [25] . Let Pr(∆) = {α | A ⇒ α B ∈ ∆} and let min(Pr(∆)) be the lowest α ∈ Pr(∆). Then ∆ ∆ ′ iff min(Pr(∆)) ≤ min(Pr(∆ ′ )). Relative to a premise set Γ, we write a b iff
We replace Definition 6 with the following definition: Let DAF ≤ be the logic resulting from constructing the attack relation Att on the basis of Definitions 5 and 10.
Example 6 (Prioritized conflict attack). Let Γ 6 = {p, q, r, ¬(s ∧ t ∧ u), p ⇒ 1 s, q ⇒ 2 t, r ⇒ 3 u}. We construct the following arguments on the basis of Γ 6 :
Os : p, p ⇒ 1 s a 9 :
Ot : q, q ⇒ 2 t a 10 :
Ou : r, r ⇒ 3 u a 11 :
The order of arguments is such that a 2 , a 5 , a 6 , a 8 , a 9 , a 12 , a 13 ≺ a 3 , a 7 , a 10 , a 14 ≺ a 4 , a 11 . By Definition 10, a 14 attacks a 2 , a 5 , a 6 , a 8 , a 9 , a 12 , and a 13 ; a 3 attacks  a 13 ; a 4 attacks a 12 ; a 11 attacks a 5 , a 8 , and a 12 ; a 10 attacks a 6 and a 13 ; and a 7 attacks a 9 . By Definition 5, a 1 attacks a 8 . As a result, a 1 , a 3 , a 4 , a 7 , a 10 , a 11 , a 14 ∈  G(Γ 6 ), while a 2 , a 5 , a 6 , a 8 , a 9 , a 12 , a 13 ∈ G(Γ 6 ). The following obligations are DAF ≤ -consequences of Γ 6 : Ot, Ou, O(t ∧ u), O¬(s ∧ u), O¬(s ∧ t), O¬s. The following obligations are not DAF ≤ -derivable from Γ 6 :
As with '⊏' in Definition 9, there are other ways of characterizing '≺' in Definition 10. For instance, instead of lifting ≤ via the weakest link principle, we could lift it via the strongest link principle, according to which an argument is as strong as the strongest priority conditional used in its construction.
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Depending on the way ≤ is lifted to , different outcomes are possible with respect to the priority puzzles studied in e.g. [9, 14, 15] . A thorough investigation of these puzzles within our framework is left for an extended version of this paper.
Anticipating violations and conflicts
Obligations which are violated or conflicted should not be detached. But what about obligations that commit us to violations or conflicts? Consider the following example, adapted from [16, 19] .
Example 7. Let Γ 7 = {p, p ⇒ q, q ⇒ r, r ⇒ ¬p}. We construct the following arguments on the basis of Γ 7 :
Oq : p, p ⇒ q a 4 : O¬p : a 3 , r ⇒ ¬p Suppose you are throwing a party. Let p (resp. q, r) abbreviate 'Peggy (resp. Quincy, Ruth) is invited to the party'. If Peggy is invited, then Quincy should be invited as well (perhaps because they are good friends and we know both of them). Likewise, if Quincy is invited then Ruth should be invited as well. But if Ruth is invited, then Peggy should not be (perhaps because we know Ruth and Peggy do not get along well). It is settled that Peggy is invited. You already sent her the official invitation, and it would be too awkward to tell her she can't come. Should Quincy and/or Ruth be invited?
Arguments a 1 , a 2 , and a 3 are in Γ 7 's grounded extension G(Γ 7 ). a 4 is not in G(Γ 7 ) since it is attacked by a 1 according to Definition 5; consequently, Γ 7 ⊢ DAF Oq and Γ 7 ⊢ DAF Or, while Γ 7 ⊢ DAF O¬p.
A more cautious reasoner may argue that Oq and Or should not be detached, since they lead to a commitment to O¬p: they form part of the detachment chain of a 4 . This commitment reflects very badly on arguments a 2 and a 3 , since O¬p is violated.
To model this behavior, we introduce the deontic doubt operator ⊙. We will use this operator to construct new arguments, called shadow arguments, the conclusion of which is of the form ⊙A. A shadow argument with conclusion ⊙A casts doubt on -and attacks -arguments with conclusion OA. Shadow arguments cannot be used to support obligations, but only to attack other arguments. They can only rule out deontic arguments. They cannot generate new consequences.
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In the resulting system DAF ⊙ , our language L is adjusted so as to include members of P within the scope of the new operator ⊙. Arguments are constructed in line with Definition 11: We say that an argument a has minimal support if there is no argument b with the same conclusion such that C(b) ⊂ C(a). In DAF ⊙ the attack relation is constructed on the basis of Definition 12: Reconsider Γ 7 from Example 7. From a 1 , we can construct the shadow argument a 5 = ⊙¬p : a 1 . By clause (i) of Definition 12, a 5 attacks a 4 , a 3 , and a 2 . As a result, a 2 and a 3 are no longer in G(Γ 7 ). Γ 7 ⊢ DAF⊙ Oq and Γ 7 ⊢ DAF⊙ Or.
We construct the following arguments on the basis of Γ 8 :
11 Shadow arguments are similar in spirit to Caminada's HY-arguments from [2] . An HYargument a is an incoherent argument constructed on the basis of the conclusion of another argument b. Since a shows that b leads to incoherence, b's conclusion is attacked by the HYargument a. Caminada shows how in the presence of HY-arguments, the property of cautious monotonicity may be restored for AFs. The same holds true for shadow arguments in our setting (cfr. infra). As Caminada's construction is defined within a framework consisting only of literals and (defeasible) rules relating (conjunctions of) literals, we cannot employ it in our setting.
12 By the construction of Definition 12, Definitions 5 and 6 become redundant in DAF ⊙ . All cases covered by these definitions are covered already by Definition 12. a 1 :
Op : ⊤, ⊤ ⇒ p a 6 : O¬s : a 5 , r ⇒ ¬s a 3 :
Oq : ⊤, ⊤ ⇒ q a 7 : Ot : a 3 , q ⇒ t a 4 :
O(p ∧ q) : a 2 , a 3 a 8 : ⊙¬s : a 1 By Definition 12 the shadow argument a 8 attacks a 6 as well as its subarguments a 2 − a 5 . Moreover, it attacks a 7 , which is a super-argument of a 3 . As a result, none of the conclusions of arguments a 2 -a 7 are DAF ⊙ -consequences of Γ 8 .
Example 4 no longer serves as a counter-example to properties 4 and 5 provided in Section 2.5. We can construct the shadow argument a 12 : ⊙s : a 5 . By clause (i) of Definition 12, this argument attacks a 4 as well as its subarguments a 1 -a 3 . As a result of this attack, Γ 4 ⊢ DAF⊙ Oq and Γ 4 ⊢ DAF⊙ Or. More generally, we can show that the cautious monotonicity property (Property 4 in Section 2.5) holds for DAF ⊙ . A proof is provided in Theorem 4 of the Appendix.
Instead of -and equivalently to -working with the ⊙-operator and Definitions 11 and 12, we could have generalized Definitions 5 and 6 so as to include attacks on sub-arguments. Definitions 5 and 6 currently entail that if a attacks b, then a attacks all super-arguments of b. In the generalized form, these definitions would entail that if a attacks b, then a attacks all superarguments of all sub-arguments of b.
There are two additional reasons for working with the doubt operator ⊙, however. First, this operator has a clear and intuitive meaning, and adds expressivity to our argumentation frameworks. Second, by characterizing shadow arguments via a separate operator we can think more transparently about (a) the implementation of additional logical properties of this operator, and (b) alternatives to Definition 12. Regarding (a), think about the strengthening rule ('If ⊙A, then ⊙B whenever B ⊢ A'), which carries some intuitive force. Regarding (b), reconsider Example 8, and suppose we add the premise ⊤ ⇒ ¬p to Γ 8 . A not-so-skeptical reasoner may argue that in this case we should not be able to cast doubt on the arguments a 3 and a 7 , since the doubt casted on argument a 4 arguably arises in view of the conflicted conditional obligation to see to it that p. 13 
Related work
Due to space limitations, we restrict our discussion of related formalisms to those of input/output logic (Section 4.1) and those based on formal argumentation frameworks (Section 4.2). A comparison with other related deontic systems, such as Nute's defeasible deontic logic [22, 21] and Horty's default-based deontic logic [13, 10, 11, 15] is left for an extended version of this article.
Input/output logic
Like the constrained input/output (I/O) logics from [19] , the DAFs defined here are tools for detaching conditional obligations relative to a set of inputs and constraints. Unlike most I/O logics, none of these DAFs validates strengthening of the antecedent (SA) for conditional obligations -from A ⇒ C to infer (A ∧ B) ⇒ C. Unrestricted (SA) is counter-intuitive if we allow for conflict-resolution via logical analysis as defined Section 3.1.1, since it allows the unrestricted derivation of more specific from less specific conditional obligations. 14 Example 9 (DAF and I/O logic). Let Γ 9 = {p, p ⇒ q, p ⇒ ¬r, q ⇒ r}. We construct the following arguments on the basis of Γ 9 :
Oq : p, p ⇒ q a 3 :
O¬r : p, p ⇒ ¬r Since a 2 and a 3 attack each other in view of Definition 6, a 2 , a 3 ∈ G(Γ 9 ), while a 1 ∈ G(Γ 9 ). Consequently, Γ 9 ⊢ DAF Or and Γ 9 ⊢ DAF O¬r while Γ 9 ⊢ DAF Oq.
In constrained I/O logic, triggered conditional obligations in the input are divided into maximally consistent subsets (MCSs). Γ ⇒ 9 has three MCSs: {p ⇒ q, q ⇒ ¬r}, {p ⇒ q, p ⇒ r}, and {q ⇒ ¬r, p ⇒ r}. In [19] two ways are presented for dealing with conflicts and constraints: via a full meet operation on the generated MCSs, or via a full join operation on the generated MCSs. The first approach gives us none of q, r, and ¬r for Γ 9 . The second gives us all three.
Some of the I/O logics defined in e.g. [18, 19, 24] validate intuitively appealing rules which are not generally valid in our DAFs, such as the rule (OR) -from A ⇒ C and B ⇒ C to infer (A ∨ B) ⇒ C. A detailed study of the appeal and implementation of (OR) and similar rules in the present argumentative setting is left for future investigation.
Formal argumentation
Several ways of modeling normative reasoning on the basis of formal argumentation have been proposed in the literature. For instance, the approach in [8] is based on bipolar abstract argumentation frameworks. Dung's abstract argumentation frameworks are enriched with a support relation that is defined over the set of abstract arguments. This device is used to express deontic conditionals. A similar idea is used in [23] where a relation for evidential support is introduced. Argumentation schemes of normative reasoning are there expressed by means of Prolog-like predicates and subsequently translated into an argumentation framework. Here, we follow the tradition of structured or instantiated argumentation in which no support relation between arguments is needed. In our approach conditional obligations are modeled by a dyadic operator ⇒ that is part of the object language. Arguments consist of sequences of applications of factual and deontic detachment. As a consequence, for instance, evidential or factual support is an intrinsic feature of our arguments and is modeled via the factual detachment rule.
The general setting of our DAFs is close to ASPIC + . For instance, in the dynamic legal argumentation systems (in short, DLAS) from [26] , deontic conditionals are also modeled via a defeasible conditional in the object language. There are several differences to our approach. For instance, our conditionals are not restricted to conjunctions of literals as antecedents. As a consequence we needed to define a strong fact attack rule (Def. 5) that, in order to avoid contamination problems (see Ex. 2), warrants that arguments with inconsistent supports are defeated. 15 Our fact attack and our shadow attack rules do not conform to the standard attack types defined in ASPIC + (rebutting, undercutting, and undermining). Our conflict attacks can be seen as forms of ASPIC + -type rebuttals where the contrary of OA is defined by O¬A. Unlike DLAS or Horty's deontic default logics, we follow the tradition in deontic logic to have a dedicated operator O for unconditional obligations which, for instance, allows to formally distinguish between cases of deontic and cases of factual detachment.
Recently, van der Torre & Villata extended the DLAS approach with deontic modalities [32] , adopting the input/output methodology from Section 4.1. The resulting systems, like DAF, allow for versions of the factual and deontic detachment rules. Moreover, they allow for the representation of permissive norms. Unlike DAF, and unlike the I/O logics from Section 4.1, these systems do not have inheritance (weakening) or aggregation rules.
Another approach in which formal argumentation is used for the analysis of traditional problems of deontic logic, such as contrary-to-duty and specificity cases is [31] . There, arguments are Gentzen-type sequents in the language of standard deontic logic and conditionals are expressed using material implication. One drawback which is avoided in our setting is that there conditionals are contrapositable and subject to strengthening of the antecedent.
Outlook
We presented a basic logic, DAF, for detaching conditional obligations based on Dung's grounded semantics for formal argumentation. We extended DAF with mechanisms for conflict-resolution and for the anticipation of conflicts and violations. For now, these mechanisms mainly serve to illustrate the modularity of our framework. A detailed study of e.g. different approaches to prioritized reasoning, or different conceptions of specificity-based conflict-resolution, is left for an extended companion paper.
We conclude by mentioning three challenges for future research. The first is to include permission statements. The second is to increase the 'logicality' of our framework by allowing for the nesting and for the truth-functional combination of formulas of the form OA, A ⇒ B, or A. The third is to extend our focus beyond grounded extensions, and to study how our framework behaves when subjected to different types of acceptability semantics for formal argumentation. Working with Dung's preferred semantics [6] , for instance, allows for the derivation of so-called floating conclusions [12, 17] . Proof. Suppose c attacks b. Since a is a superargument of b, c also attacks a and thus c is fact attacked by Lemma 1.
Definition 13. Let a = OA 1 : . . . be an argument with UO(a) = {A 1 , . . . , A n } and let π be a permutation of {2, . . . , n}. We know that for each A i ∈ UO(a) there is a subargument b i = OA i : . . . of a. We construct the argument a π = O UO(a) : . . . as follows.
• a
When we write a we refer to a π n for π = id (i.e., π(i) = i).
The following fact follows in view of Definition 13 and the definition of UO: 
′ attacks a and by Lemma 
Altogether, any attacker of c is fact attacked and hence c ∈ G(Γ).
The following lemma follows immediately.
Proof. By compactness there is a finite {A 1 , . . . , A n } ⊆ ∆ such that B ∈ Cn CL ({A 1 , . . . , A n }). By multiple applications of Lemma 7 
Theorem 2. There is no A for which Γ ⊢ DAF OA and Γ ⊢ DAF O¬A.
Proof. Assume for a contradiction that Γ ⊢ DAF OA and Γ ⊢ DAF O¬A. Thus, there are a = OA : . . . ∈ G(Γ) and b = O¬A : . . . ∈ G(Γ). However, since b conflict attacks a, this is not possible since G(Γ) is conflict-free.
Proof. Let ∆ = {A 1 , . . . , A n } and Γ ′ = Γ ∪ ∆ ⇒ . By the supposition we know that for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} there is a a i = OA i : . . . ∈ G(Γ). Let a We first show that case (b) is not possible. In this case ¬ (UO(a 1 ) ∪ . . . ∪ UO(a n ) ∪ UO(b)) ∈ Cn L (Γ). Hence, ( ( n i=1 UO(a i )) ⊃ ¬ UO(b)) ∈ Cn L (Γ). Note that since a i ∈ G(Γ) for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, by Lemma 5 , also a i ∈ G(Γ). Moreover, we know by multiple applications of Lemma 7 , that alsoâ =â n ∈ G(Γ) whereâ 2 = O (UO(a 1 ) ∪ UO(a 2 )) : a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n = O n i=1 UO(a i ) :â n−1 , a n . By weakening and Lemma 3, alsoâ ′ = O¬ UO(b) :â ∈ G(Γ). Note thatâ ′ attacks b in A(Γ ′ ), Att(Γ ′ ) . Thus, by Lemma 1, â ′ is fact attacked and ¬ UO(â ′ ) ∈ Cn L (Γ ′ ). Thus, also ¬ UO(â ′ ) ∈ Cn L (Γ). Hence,â ′ is also fact attacked in A(Γ), Att(Γ) . This contradictsâ ′ ∈ G(Γ). In case (a), c attacks some a i . Since a i ∈ G(Γ) and by Lemma We now move to DAFs with shadow attacks. In the following we will silently assume that Lemma 1 also applies to argumentation frameworks with shadow attacks, but leave the simple proof to the reader. ′ cannot be defended from this attack and a ∈ G(Γ) this is a contradiction.
We have thus shown that c is fact attacked. Since c was arbitrary this is sufficient to show that b ∈ G(Γ ′ ).
